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Abstract
Distributed agreement-based algorithms are often specified in a crash-stop asynchronous model
augmented by Chandra and Toueg’s unreliable failure detectors. In such models, correct nodes
stay up forever, incorrect nodes eventually crash and remain down forever, and failure detectors
behave correctly forever eventually, However, in reality, nodes as well as communication links
both crash and recover without deterministic guarantees to remain in some state forever.
In this paper, we capture this realistic temporary and probabilitic behaviour in a simple new
system model. Moreover, we identify a large algorithm class for which we devis a property-
preserving transformation. Using this transformation, many algorithms written for the asyn-
chronous crash-stop model run correctly and unchanged in real systems.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Distributed algorithms
Keywords and phrases Crash recovery, consensus, asynchrony
1 Introduction
Distributed systems comprise multiple software and hardware components that are bound
to eventually fail [10]. Such failures can cause service malfunction or unavailability, in-
curring significant costs to mission-critical systems, e.g., automation systems and on-line
transactions. The failures’ impact can be minimized by protocols that let systems agree on
values and actions despite failures. As a consequence, many variants of the agreement or
the consensus problem [29] under different assumptions have been studied. Of particular
importance are synchrony and failure model assumptions, as they determine the problem’s
complexity.
In the simplest failure model, often called the crash-stop model, a process fails by stopping
to execute its protocol and never recovers. In an asynchronous system, i.e., a system without
bounds on execution delays or message latency, assuming the crash-stop failure model, makes
it impossible to distinguish a crashed from a very slow process. This renders consensus-like
problems unsolvable deterministically [16], already in this very simple failure model. To
circumvent this impossibility, previous works have investigated ways to relax the underlying
asynchrony assumption either explicitly, e.g., by using partial synchrony [12], or implicitly,
by defining oracles that encapsulate time, e.g., failure detectors [8]. The result is a large
and rich body of literature that builds on top of the former and latter techniques to solve
consensus-like problems in the presence of crash-stop failures. Typically, the respective
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proofs rely on assumptions of the “eventually forever” form: the correct nodes staying
up forever, incorrect nodes eventually crashing and remaining down forever, and failure
detectors producing wrong output in the beginning, but eventually providing correct results
forever.
However, such "eventually forever" assumptions are not met by real distributed systems.
In reality, processes may crash but their processors reboot, and the recovered process re-
joins the computation. Communication might also fail at any point in time, but get restored
later. Hence, the failure and recovery modes of processes as well as communication links
are in reality probabilistic and temporary [13, 15, 31], especially in systems incorporating
many unreliable off-the-shelf low-cost devices and communication technologies. This led to
the development of crash-recovery models, where processes repeatedly leave and join the
computation unannounced. This requires new failure detector definitions and new consen-
sus algorithms built on top of these failure detectors [1, 24, 11, 21] as well as completely
new solutions (without failure detectors) that consider different classes of failures, namely
classified according to how many times a process can crash and recover [25]. However, such
solutions eliminate the "eventually forever" assumptions only on the processes’ level and
not for the communication and failure detectors. Moreover, they do not tell us whether
crash-stop algorithms can be “ported unchanged” to crash-recovery settings.
To this end, this paper investigates how to re-use consensus algorithms defined for the
crash-stop model with reliable links and failure detectors in a more realistic crash-recovery
model, where processes and links can crash and recover probabilistically and for an un-
bounded number of times. Our models allow unstable nodes, i.e., nodes that fail and recover
infinitely often. These are often excluded or limited in number in other models. In contrast,
we explicitly allow unstable behavior of any number of processes and links, by modeling com-
munication problems and crash-recovery behaviors as probabilistic and temporary, rather
than deterministic and perpetual. Our system model, similar to existing models that rely on
probabilistic factors, e.g., coin flips, comes with the trade-off of solving consensus (namely
the termination property), with probability 1, rather than deterministically.
However, unlike existing solutions that incorporate probabilistic behavior, our approach
does not aim at inventing new consensus algorithms but rather focuses on using existing
deterministic ones to solve consensus with probability 1. Our approach is modular: we build
a wrapper that interacts with a crash-stop algorithm as a black box, exchanges messages with
other wrappers and transforms these messages into messages that the crash-stop algorithm
understands. We then formally define classes of algorithms and safety properties for which
we prove that our wrapper constructs a system that preserves these properties. Additionally,
we show that termination with probability 1 is guaranteed for wrapped algorithms of this
class. Moreover, this class is wide and includes the celebrated Chandra-Toueg algorithm [8]
as well as the instantiation of the indulgent framework with failure detectors from [20] . Our
work allows such algorithms to be ported unchanged to our crash-recovery model. Hence
applications built on top of such algorithms can run in real systems with crash-recovery
behavior by simply using our wrapper.
Contributions: To summarize, our main contributions are:
New system models that capture probabilistic and temporary failures and recoveries of
processes and communication links in real distributed systems (described in Section 3)
A wrapper framework that allows a wide class of crash-stop consensus algorithms to be
used unchanged in our more realistic models (described in Section 4)
Formal properties describing which crash-stop consensus algorithms benefit from our
framework and hence can be reused to solve consensus in crash-recovery settings (de-
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scribed Sections 5 and 6)
In addition to the sections presenting our contributions, we discuss related work in Section 2
and conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Related Work
Several works addressed the impossibility of asynchronous consensus. One direction exploits
the concept of partial synchrony [12], in which an asynchronous system becomes synchronous
after some unknown global stabilization time (GST) for a bounded number of rounds. For
the same model, ASAP [3] is a consensus algorithm where every process decides no later than
round GST+f+2 (optimal). Another direction augments asynchronous systems with failure
detector oracles, and builds asynchronous consensus algorithms on top [8]. These detectors
typically behave erratically at first, but eventually start behaving correctly forever. Like
with partial synchrony, the failure detectors must behave correctly for only "sufficiently
long" instead of forever [8]; however, quantifying "sufficiently long" is not expressible in a
purely asynchronous model [9]. Both lines of work initially investigated crash-stop failures of
processes. In real systems processes as well as network links crash and recover multiple times
and sometimes even indefinitely. This gave rise to a large body of literature that studied
how to adapt the two lines of work to crash-recovery behavior of processes and links. We
next survey some of this literature.
Failure detectors and consensus algorithms for crash recovery: Dolev et al. [11]
consider an asynchronous environment where communication links first lose messages ar-
bitrarily, but eventually communication stabilizes such that a majority of processes forms
a forever strongly connected component. Processes belonging to such a strongly-connected
component are termed correct, and the others faulty. Process state is always (fully) persisted
in stable storage. The authors propose a failure detector that allows the correct processes
to reach a consensus decision and show that the rotating coordinator algorithm [8] works
unchanged in their setting, as long as all messages are constantly retransmitted. This relies
on piggybacking all previous messages onto the last message, and regularly retransmitting
the last message. As this yields very large messages, they also propose a modification of [8]
for which no piggybacking is necessary. While our results also rely on strongly connected
components, we do not require their existence to be deterministic nor perpetual. We also
do not require piggybacking in order for algorithms like [8] to be used unchanged.
Oliveira et al. [28] consider a crash-recovery setting with correct processes that may
crash only finitely many times (and thus eventually stay up forever) and faulty processes
that permanently crash or crash infinitely often. As in [8], the authors note that correct
processes only need to stay up for long enough periods in practice (rather than forever),
but this cannot be expressed in the asynchronous model. The authors take the consensus
algorithm of [30] which uses stubborn links and transform it to work in the crash-recovery
setting by logging every step into stable storage and adding a fast-forward mechanism for
skipping rounds. Hurfin et al. [22] describe an algorithm using the S detector in the crash-
recovery case. The notions of correct/faulty processes and of failure detectors are the same
as in Oliviera et al [28]. Their algorithm is however more efficient when using stable storage
compared to [28]: there is only one write per round (of multiple data), and the required
network buffer capacity for each channel (connecting a pair of processes) is one. Compared
to [28] and [22] our system does not regard processes that crash and recover infinitely often
as faulty and hence we allow such “unstable” processes to implement consensus.
Aguilera et al. [1] consider a crash-recovery system with lossy links. They show that
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previously proposed failure detectors for the crash-recovery setting have anomalous behaviors
even in synchronous systems when considering unstable processes, i.e., processes that crash
and recover infinitely often. The authors propose new failure detectors to mitigate this
drawback. They also determine the necessary conditions regarding stable storage that allow
consensus to be solved in the crash-recovery model, and provide two efficient consensus
algorithms: one with, and one without using stable storage. Unlike [1], we do not exclude
unstable processes from implementing consensus, thus our model tolerates a wider variety
of node behavior. Furthermore, our wrapper requires no modifications to the existing crash-
stop consensus algorithms, as it treats them as black-boxes.
Modular Crash-Recovery Approaches: Similar to [1], Freiling et al. [18] investigate
the solvability of consensus in the crash-recovery model under varying assumptions, regard-
ing the number of unstable and correct processes and what is persisted in stable storage.
They reuse existing algorithms from the crash-stop model in a modular way (without chang-
ing them) or semi-modular way, with some modifications to the algorithm (as in the case
of [8]). Similar to our work, they provide algorithms to emulate a crash-stop system on top
of a crash-recovery system. Our work, however, always reuses algorithms in a fully modular
way, and we define a wide class of algorithms for which such reuse is possible. Furthermore,
as we model message losses, processes crashes, and process recoveries probabilistically, our
results also apply if processes are unstable, i.e., crash and recover infinitely often.
Randomized Consensus Algorithms: Besides the literature that studied determin-
istic consensus algorithms, existing works have also explored randomized algorithms to solve
“consensus with probability 1”. These include, for example, techniques based on using ran-
dom coin-flips [2, 5, 17] or probabilistic schedulers [7]. In systems with dynamic communi-
cation failures, multiple randomized algorithms [27, 26] addressed the k-consensus problem,
which requires only k processes to eventually decide. Moniz et al. [27] considered a system
with correct processes and a bound on the number of faulty transmission. In a wireless
setting, where multiple processes share a communication channel, Moniz et al. [26] devise
an algorithm tolerating up to f Byzantine processes and requires a bound on the number
of omission faults affecting correct processes. In comparison, our work in this paper does
not use randomization in the algorithm itself: we focus on using existing deterministic al-
gorithms to solve consensus (with probability 1) in networks with probabilistic failure and
recovery patterns of processes and links.
3 System Models
We start with defining the notation we use, and then define general concepts common to all
of our models. Then, we define each of our models in turn.
Notation: Given a set S, we define S⊥ to be the set S ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ is a distinguished
element not present in S. The set of finite sequences over a set S is denoted by S∗. We
also call sequences words, when customary. The empty sequence is denoted by []. Given a
non-empty sequence, head defines its first element, tail the remainder of the sequence, and,
if the sequence is finite, last its last element. Given two sequences u and v, where u is finite,
u · v denotes their concatenation. For a word u, |u| denotes the length of u. Letting u(i) be
the i-th letter of u, we say that u is a subword of v if there exists a strictly monotone function
f : N→ N such that u(i) = v(f(i)), for 1 ≤ i ≤ |u| if u is finite, and for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . .} if
u is infinite. Analogously, v is a superword of u.
We denote the space of partial functions between sets A and B by A ⇀ B. Note that
(A→ B) ⊆ (A ⇀ B). Given any function f : A ⇀ B, its graph, written Γ(f), is the relation
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{(x, y) | f(x) = y}. The range of f , written ran(f), is the set {y | (x, y) ∈ Γ(f)}.
Common concepts: We consider a fixed finite set of processes Π = {1 . . . N}, and a
fixed countable set of values, denoted V. For each algorithm there is an algorithm-specific
countable set of local states Σp, for each process p ∈ Π. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves
to algorithms where Σp = Σq, ∀p, q ∈ Π. Note that this does not exclude algorithms that
take decisions based on identifiers. We define the global state space Σ =
∏
p∈Π Σp. Given a
s ∈ Σ, we define sp ∈ Σp as the projection of s to its p-th component.
A property over an alphabet A is a set of infinite words over A. We use standard
definitions of liveness and safety properties [4]. A property P is a safety property if, for
every infinite word w /∈ P , there exists a finite prefix u of w such that the concatenation
u · v /∈ P for all infinite words v. Intuitively, the prefix u is “bad” and not recoverable from.
A property P is a liveness property if for any finite word u there exists an infinite word v
such that u · v ∈ P . Intuitively, “good” things can always happen later.
In this paper, we are interested in preserving properties over the alphabet Σ between the
crash-stop and crash-recovery versions of an algorithm. In particular, we assume that the
local states Σp are records, with two distinguished fields: inp of type V and dec of type V⊥.
Intuitively, a dec value of ⊥ indicates that the process has not decided yet. For an infinite
word w over the alphabet Σ, let w(i, p) denote the local state of the process p at the i-th
letter of the word. Let us state the standard safety properties of consensus in our notation.
Validity. Decided values must come from the set of input values. Formally, validity describes
the set of words w such that ∀p, i, v. w(i, p).dec = v ∧ v 6= ⊥ =⇒ ∃q. w(1, q).inp = v
Integrity. Processes do not change their decisions. Formally, integrity describes the set of
words w such that ∀p, i. v. w(i, p).dec = v ∧ v 6= ⊥ =⇒ ∀i′ > i. w(i′, p).dec = v
(Uniform) Agreement. No two processes ever make different non-⊥ decisions. Formally,
∀p, q, i, j. w(i, p).dec 6= ⊥ 6= w(j, q).dec =⇒ w(i, p).dec = w(j, q).dec
To simplify our preservation results for safety properties, our models store information
about process failures separately from Σ. As a consequence, the standard crash-stop termi-
nation property cannot be expressed as a property over Σ: it is conditioned on a process not
failing. However, we do not directly use the crash-stop notion of termination and we omit
this definition here. Instead, we will prove the following property for the algorithms in our
probabilistic crash-recovery model:
Probabilistic crash-recovery termination. With probability 1, all processes eventually de-
cide.
3.1 The crash-stop model
Our definition of the crash-stop model is standard and closely follows [8]. We assume an
asynchronous environment, with processes taking steps in an interleaved fashion. Processes
communicate using reliable links, and can query failure detectors.
Failure detectors: A failure pattern fp is an infinite word over the alphabet 2Π. Intuitively,
each letter is the set of failed processes in a transition step of a run of a transition system.
A failure detector with range R is a function from failure patterns to properties over the
alphabet R.1 A failure detector D is unreliable if D(fp) is a liveness property for all fp.
1 This definition does not distinguish which process received the output, which is sufficient for S. The
definition can be easily extended to other failure detectors like W.
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Intuitively, a detector constrains how the failure detector outputs (theR values) must depend
on the failure pattern of a run, and unreliable detectors can produce arbitrary outputs in
the beginning. We write FD(R) for the set of all detectors with range R.
Algorithms and algorithm steps: The type of crash-stop steps over a message spaceM
and a failure detector range R, written CSS(M,R) is defined as a pair of functions of types:
next : Σp × (Π×M)⊥ ×R → Σp
send : Σp → (Π ⇀M).
Intuitively, given zero or one messages received from some other processes and an output
of the failure detector, a step maps the current process state to a new state, and maps the
new state to a set of messages to be sent, with zero or one messages sent to each process.
A crash-stop algorithm A over Σ,M and R is a tuple (I, step, D,Nf ) where:
I ⊆ Σ is the finite set of initial states,
step ∈ CSS(M,R) is the step function, and
D ∈ FD(R) is a failure detector.
Nf < N is the resilience condition, i.e., the number of failures tolerated by the algorithm
(recall that we consider a fixed N).
We refer to the components of an algorithm A by A.I, A.step, A.D and A.Nf . As I is
finite, it will admit a uniform distribution in our probabilistic model in Section 3.3.
Configurations: As noted earlier, we focus on preserving properties over Σ between crash-
stop and crash-recovery models. However, Σ contains insufficient information to model the
algorithm’s crash-stop executions (runs). In particular, to account for (1) asynchronous
message delivery and (2) process failures, we must extend states to configurations. A crash-
stop configuration is a triple (s,M,F ) where:
s ∈ Σ is the (global) state,
M ⊆ Π×Π×M is the set of in-flight messages, where (p, q,m) ∈M represents a message
m that was sent to p by q. For simplicity, M is a set, i.e., we assume that each message
is sent at most once between any pair of processes during the entire execution of the
algorithm. This suffices for round-based algorithms that tag messages with their round
numbers, and exchange messages once per round.
F ⊆ Π is the set of failed processes.
As with algorithms, we refer to the components of a configuration c by c.s, c.M and c.F .
Step labels and transitions: While the algorithm steps are deterministic, the asyn-
chronous transition system is not: any (non-failed) process can take a step at any point
in time, with different possible received messages, and different failure detector outputs.
Accessing this non-determinism information is useful in proofs, so we extract it as follows.
A crash-stop step label is a quadruple (p, rmsg, fails, fdo), where:
p ∈ Π is the process taking the step,
rmsg ∈ (Π×M)⊥ is the message p receives in the step (⊥ modeling a missing message),
fails ⊆ Π is the set of processes failed at the end of the step,
fdo ∈ R is p’s output of the failure detector.
A crash-stop step of the algorithm A is a triple (c, l, c′), where c and c′ are configurations
and l is a label. Crash-stop steps must satisfy the following properties:
p /∈ c.F , i.e., p is not failed at the start of the step.
With sp and s′p denoting process p’s state in c and c′ respectively, s′p = next(sp, rmsg, fdo),
and s′q = sq for q 6= p. That is, p takes a step according to the label and the algorithm’s
rules, and the other processes do not move.
If rmsg 6= ⊥, then (p, rmsg) ∈ c.M , i.e., if a message was received, then it was in flight.
Letting smsgs = send(s′p), then c′.M = (c.M \ rcvd) ∪ {(q, p,m) | (q,m) ∈ Γ(smsgs)} ,
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where rcvd is {(p, rmsg)} if rmsg 6= ⊥ and ∅ otherwise. That is, the received message is
removed from the set of in-flight messages, and the produced messages are added.
c.F ⊆ c′.F . That is, failed processes do not recover in the crash-stop setting.
fails = c′.F .
Algorithm runs: A finite, respectively infinite crash-stop run of A is a finite, respec-
tively infinite alternating sequence c0, l0, c1 . . . of configurations and labels, that ends in a
configuration if finite, such that
c0.s ∈ A.I, i.e., the initial state is allowed by the algorithm.
For each ci, li and ci+1 in the sequence, (ci, li, ci+1) is a step of A.
For each ci in the sequence, |ci.F | ≤ Nf (the resilience condition is satisfied).
There is a failure pattern fp such that the sequence ci.F is a prefix of fp, and the sequence
fdoi is a prefix of D(fp). That is, the output of the failure detector satisfies the condition
of the failure detector.
Such a run has reliable links if, whenever (p, q,m) ∈ ci.M , and p, q /∈ cj .F for all j, then
there exists a k ≥ i such that lk = (p, (q,m), fails, fdo) for some fails and fdo. That is,
all in-flight messages eventually get delivered, unless the sender or the receiver is faulty.
The crash-stop system of the algorithm A is the sequence of all crash-stop runs of A. The
crash-stop system with reliable links of the algorithm A is the set of all crash stop runs with
reliable links.
As mentioned before, we are interested in properties that are sequences of global states.
In this sense, runs contain too much information (e.g., in-flight messages). Thus, given
a run ρ, we define its state trace tr(ρ), obtained by removing the labels and projecting
configurations onto just the states. We introduce a notion of a state property: an infinite
sequence of (global) states. The crash-stop system (with or without reliable links) satisfies a
state property P if for every run ρ of the system, tr(ρ) ∈ P . We later show that our crash-
recovery wrappers for crash-stop protocols preserve important state properties of crash-stop
algorithms. Lastly, we note down some simple properties of crash-stop runs.
I Lemma 1 (Reliable links irrelevant for prefixes). Let ρ be a finite crash-stop run of A. Then,
ρ can be extended to an infinite crash-stop run of A that has reliable links, by extending tr(ρ)
to include infinite message retransmissions for all sent messages.
Summary of time and failure assumptions
Time. Processes are asynchronous and have no notion of time. Links are asynchronous.
Failures. Processes can fail by halting forever, while links interconnecting them do not fail.
3.2 The lossy synchronous crash-recovery model
We next define our first crash-recovery model. Formally, this a lossy synchronous crash-
recovery model, with non-deterministic, but not probabilistic losses, crashes, and recoveries.
We use it to prove the preservation of safety properties without taking probabilities into
account, since they are not used in such arguments. In this model, we will not distinguish
between volatile and persistent memory of a process. Instead, we assume that all memory is
persistent. This can be emulated in practice by persisting all volatile memory before taking
any actions with side-effects (such as sending network messages). Finally, while the model
is formally synchronous, in that all processes take steps simultaneously, it also captures
processing delays, as a slow process behaves like a process that crashes and later recovers.
Algorithms and algorithm steps: A crash-recovery step over a message spaceM, written
CRS(M) is defined as:
next : Σp × (Π ⇀M)→ Σp
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send : Σp → (Π→M).
In other words, a step determines the new state based on the current state and the set of
received messages. Given the new state, a process sends a message to every other processes
(including itself). Compared to the asynchronous setting (Section 3.1), in this model:
1. A process can receive multiple messages simultaneously (rather than receiving at most
one message in a step).
2. Every process sends a message to every other process at each step. We use this in later
sections to send heartbeat messages, if there is nothing else to exchange. We do not
require any guarantees on the delivery of the sent messages in this model.
3. No failure detector oracle is specified. The synchrony assumption of this model inherently
provides spurious failure detection: each process can suspect all peers it did not hear
from in the last message exchange. This is in fact exactly what we will use to provide
failure detector outputs to the “wrapped” crash-stop algorithms run in this setting2.
A crash-recovery algorithm AR over Σ,M is a pair (I, step) where:
I ⊆ Σ is a finite set of initial states, and
step ∈ CRS(M) is the step function.
Configurations: As in the crash-stop case, we require more than just the global states to
model algorithm executions; we hence introduce configurations. These, however, differ from
those for the crash-stop setting. As communication is synchronous, we need not store the in-
flight messages; they are either delivered by the end of a step, or they are gone. Furthermore,
as processes take steps synchronously, we can introduce a global step number. 3
A crash-recovery configuration is a tuple (n, s, F ) where
n ∈ N is the step number,
s ∈ Σ is the (global) state,
F ⊆ Π is the set of failed processes.
We denote the set of all crash-recovery configurations by CR. Note that this set is countable.
This will allow us to impose a Markov chain structure on the system in the later model.
Step labels and transitions: As in the crash-stop setting, we use labels to capture all
sources of non-determinism in a step. We will use these labels to assign probabilities to
different state transitions in the probabilistic model of the next section.
A crash-recovery step label is a pair (rmsgs, fails), where:
rmsgs : Π → (Π ⇀ M) denotes the message received in the step; rmsgs(p)(q) is the
message received by p on the channel from q to p. Note that the function is partial. As
we assume that q always attempts to send a message to p, if rmsgs(p)(q) is undefined
(rmsgs(p) is a partial function), then either the message on this channel was lost in the
step, or the sender q has failed.
fails ⊆ Π is the set of processes that are failed at the end of the step.
The crash-recovery steps (or transitions) of A, written Tr(A), is the set of all triples
(c, l, c′), where, letting l = (rmsgs, fails) and letting sp and s′p denote the state of the
process p in c and c′, we have:
if p /∈ c.F , then s′p = next(sp, rmsgs(p)); that is, processes that are up handle their
messages. We assume that the state change is atomic; this can be implemented, since
we assume that all process memory is persistent.
if p ∈ c.F , then s′p = sp. Failed processes do not change their state.
2 Similar to Gafni’s round-by-round fault detectors [19]; in our case, the detectors are “step-by-step”
3 We use global step numbers later in the probabilistic model, to assign failure probabilities for processes
and links (e.g., a probability pij(t) of a message from i to j getting through, if sent in the t-th step).
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if rmsgs(p)(q) is defined, then q /∈ c.F , and rmsgs(p)(q) = send(sq). That is, only
the sent step messages are received (no message corruption), and messages from failed
senders are not received.
fails = c′.F .
Algorithm runs: A finite, resp. infinite crash-recovery run of A is a finite, resp. infinite
alternating sequence c0, l0, c1 . . . of (crash-recovery) configurations and labels, ending in a
configuration if finite, such that:
c0.s ∈ A.I, i.e., the initial state is allowed by the algorithm
(ci, li, ci+1) ∈ Tr(A) for all i, that is, each step is a valid crash-recovery transition of A.
The crash-recovery system of algorithm A is the sequence of all crash-recovery runs of A.
Summary of time and failure assumptions
Time. Processes are synchronous and operate in a time-triggered fashion. Links are syn-
chronous (all delivered messages respect a timing upper bound on delivery).
Failure. Processes can fail and recover infinitely often. In every time-step, a link can be
either crashed or correct. A crashed link drops all sent messages (if any).
3.3 The probabilistic crash-recovery model
We now extend the lossy synchronous crash-recovery model to a probabilistic model, where
both the successful delivery of messages and failures follow a distribution that can vary
with time. A probabilistic network N is a function of type Π × Π × N → [0, 1], such that
∃N > 0. ∀p, q, t. N (q, p, t) > N Intuitively, N (q, p, t) is the delivery probability for a
message sent from p to q at time (step number) t. A probabilistic failure pattern FP is a
function Π × N → [0, 1], such that ∃F > 0. ∀p, t. F < FP(p, t) < 1 − F . Intuitively,
FP(p, t) gives the probability of p being up at time t.4
Given a crash-recovery algorithm AR, a probabilistic network N and failure pattern FP ,
a probabilistic crash-recovery system SR(AR,N , FP) is the Markov chain [6] with:
The set of states CR, i.e., the crash-recovery configuration set.
The transition probabilities P (c)(c′) defined as P (c) = nftrans(c)·trans(c), where nftrans(c)
is the normalization factor for trans(c) and trans(c)(c′) is defined as:
trans(c)(c′) =
∑
rmsgs,fails
J(c, (rmsgs, fails), c′) ∈ Tr(AR)K ·∏
p,q
(Jrmsgs(p)(q) definedK · N (q, p, c.n)
+ Jrmsgs(p)(q) undefinedK · Jq /∈ c.F K · (1−N (q, p, c.n)))
·
∏
p
((1− FP(p, c′.n)) · Jp ∈ failsK + FP(p, c′.n) · Jp /∈ failsK).
Here, J · K maps the Boolean values true and false to 1 and 0 respectively. Intuitively,
a transition from c to c′ is only possible if it is possible in the lossy synchronous crash-
recovery model. The probability of this transition is calculated by summing over all
labels that lead from c to c′, and giving each such label a weight. Note that the only
non-determinism in the transitions of Tr(AR) comes exactly from the behavior we deem
probabilistic: messages being dropped by the network, and process failures.
It is easy to see that nf trans(c) is well defined for all c, as for a fixed configuration c,
trans(c)(c′) is non-zero for only finitely many configurations c′.
4 Considering infinite time, the upper and lower bounds on FP(p, t) ensure that, with probability 1,
there is a time when process p is up.
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The distribution over the initial states defined by ι = norm(init), where
Pf (F ) =
∏
p/∈F
FP(p, 0) · ∏
p∈F
(1− FP(p, 0)),
init(n, s, F ) = Pf (F ) · Jn = 0K · Js ∈ AR.IK,
and norm normalizes the probabilities. Note that normalization is possible, since we
assumed that after fixing N , each algorithm comes with a finite set of initial states.
Summary of time and failure assumptions
Time. Processes are synchronous and operate in a time-triggered fashion. Links are syn-
chronous (all delivered messages respect a timing upper bound on delivery).
Failure. Processes and links can fail and recover infinitely often. At the beginning of
any time-step a crashed process/link can recover with positive probability and a correct
process/link can fail with positive probability.
Important: All our results (Section 4, 5, and 6) hold for both crash-recovery models
(Section 3.2 and 3.3 ). However, probabilities are only needed to prove results of Section 6.
4 Wrapper for Crash-Stop Algorithms
We now define the transformation of a crash-stop algorithm A into a crash-recovery algo-
rithm AR. Intuitively, we do this by (also illustrated in Figure 1):
Generating a synchronous crash-recovery step using a series of crash-stop steps. Each
step in the series handles one individual received message, allowing us to iteratively
handle multiple simultaneously incoming messages and bridge the synchrony mismatch
between the crash-stop and crash-recovery models.
Using round-by-round failure detectors to produce the failure detector outputs to be fed
to the crash-stop algorithm. These outputs are from the set 2Π.5
Providing reliable links, as required by the crash-stop algorithm. During each crash-
recovery step, we buffer all outgoing messages of a process, and send them repeatedly in
the subsequent crash-recovery steps, until an acknowledgment is received.
We first define the message and state spaces of the crash-recovery version AR of a given
crash-stop algorithm A as follows:
InAR, we send a pair of messages to each process in each step: the actual payload message
(from A), replaced by a special heartbeat message hb being sent when no payload needs
to be sent; and an acknowledgment message, confirming the receipt of the last message
on the channel in the opposite direction,
The local state sp of a process p has three components (st, buff, acks): (1) st stores the
state of p in the target crash-stop algorithm; (2) buff represents p’s outgoing message
buffers, with one buffer for each process (including one for p); and (3) acks(q) records
the last message that p received from q. The buffers are LIFO, a choice which proves
crucial for our termination proof (Section 6).
Next, given a crash-recovery state s, a process p, and the messages rmsgs received by p in
the given round, we define unfold(p, s, rmsgs), p’s local step unfolding for s and rmsgs.
We define unfold(p, s, rmsgs) as the sequence of intermediate steps p takes. Said dif-
ferently, unfold(p, s, rmsgs) is a sequence of crash-recovery states and crash-stop labels
5 We could instead produce outputs that never suspect anyone, since no process crashes forever in our
probabilistic model. However for a weaker model considered later (where processes are allowed to
crash forever), we need failure detectors that suspect processes.
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s0, l0, s1, l1, s2, . . . sn, where the intermediate state si represents the state of p after process-
ing the message of the i-th process. In a crash-recovery run, p does not actually transition
through the states s1, . . . , sn. These states are listed here separately to intuitively show how
the next “real” state to which p will transition is computed. The unfolding also allows to
relate traces of A and AR more easily in our proofs, as we produce a crash-stop run from
a crash-recovery run when proving properties of the wrapper. The content of p’s buffers
changes as we progress through the states si of unfold(p, s, rmsgs), as the wrapper routes
the messages to A and receives new ones from it. The failure detector output (recorded in
the labels li) remains constant through the unfolding: all processes from whom no message
was received in the crash-recovery step are suspected. Finally, the set of failed processes in
each label is defined to be empty. We emulate the process recovery that is possible in the
crash-recovery model by crash-stop runs in which no processes fail.
Probabilistic Channel
Crash-Stop Consensus Algorithm
Failure 
Detector
Reliable 
Channel
Crash-stop messages and 
failure detector output
Crash-Recovery Wrapper
Crash-recovery messages and 
acknowledgements
Figure 1 Wrapper concept.
Finally, given a crash-stop algorithm A with an unre-
liable failure detector and with the per-process state
space Σp, we define its crash-recovery version AR where:
the initial states of AR constitute the set of crash-
recovery configurations c such that there exists a
crash-stop configuration cs ∈ A.I satisfying the fol-
lowing: (i) the initial states of c and cs correspond
to each other and in c all buffers are empty, (ii) no
messages are acknowledged, and (iii) the failed pro-
cesses in c and cs are the same.
the next state of a process p is computed by unfold-
ing, based on the messages p received in this round.
the message that p sends to a process q pairs the
first element of p’s (LIFO) buffer for q with the ac-
knowledgment for the last message that p received
from q.
the execution is short-circuited as soon as a process
decides. This is achieved by broadcasting a mes-
sage to all other processes, announcing that it has
decided. When processes receives such a message,
they immediately decide and short-circuits their ex-
ecution.
Short-circuiting behavior is a common pattern for consensus algorithms [8, 20]. It can be
applied in a black-box way and it is sound for any crash-stop consensus algorithm.
A more formal description of the wrapper can be found in Appendix A. Given a run of
crash-recovery version of an algorithm A, we define its state trace, tr(·), as the sequence of
configurations obtained by removing the labels, projecting each configuration c onto c.s, and
projecting each local state c.sp onto c.sp.st. We overload the function symbol tr(·) to work
on both crash-stop and crash-recovery runs. Note that both crash-stop and crash-recovery
state properties are sequences of states from the same state space Σ.
5 Preservation Results
As our first main result, we show that crash-recovery versions of algorithms produced by our
wrapper preserve a wide class of safety properties. The class includes the safety properties
of consensus: validity, integrity and agreement (Section 3). In other words, if a trace of
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a crash-recovery version of an algorithm violates a property, then some crash-stop trace
of the same algorithm also violates that property. We show this in the non-probabilistic
crash-recovery model. However, the result also translates to the probabilistic model, since
all allowed traces of the probabilistic model are also traces of the non-probabilistic one.
Preserving all safety properties for all algorithms and failure detectors would be too
strong of a requirement, for two reasons. First, as our crash-recovery model assumes nothing
about link or process reliability, in finite runs we can give no guarantees about the accuracy
of the simulated failure detectors. Second, the crash-recovery model is synchronous, meaning
that different processes take steps simultaneously. This is impossible in the crash-stop model,
which is asynchronous. Thus, the following simple safety property OneChanges defined by
“the local state of at most one process changes between two successive states in a trace”
holds in the crash-stop model, but not in the crash-recovery model (equivalently, we can
find a crash-recovery trace, but not a crash-stop trace that violates the property).
We work around the first problem by assuming that the crash-stop algorithms use un-
reliable failure detectors. For the second problem, we restrict the class of safety properties
that we wish to preserve as follows. Consider a property P . Let u /∈ P and w be runs with
the same initial states (i.e., u(1) = w(1)) such that u is a subword of w (recall we define
subwords earlier). P then belongs to the class of properties not repairable through detours if
w /∈ P for all such u and w. Intuitively, this means that the sequence of states represented
by u inherently violates P ; so adding “detours” by the means of additional intermediate
states (forming w) does not help satisfy P .
The property OneChanges is an example of a safety property that is repairable through
detours: we can take any word that violates OneChanges and extend it to a word that does
not violate OneChanges. However, we can easily show that the following safety properties
are not repairable through detours:
The safety properties of consensus. E.g., consider the validity property: given a word u
such that v = u(i, p).dec is a non-initial and a non-⊥ value, adding further states between
the initial state and u(i) does not change the fact that v is neither initial nor ⊥.
State invariant properties, defined by a set S of “good” states, such that for a trace u,
u ∈ Inv(S) only if ∀i. u(i) ∈ S. Equivalently, these properties rule out traces which
reach the “bad” states in the complement of S. Intuitively, if a bad state is reached, we
cannot fix it by adding more states before or after the bad state.
We establish the following lemma, which is essential to the ensuing preservation theorem.
I Lemma 2 (Crash-recovery traces have crash-stop superwords). Let A be a crash-stop al-
gorithm with an unreliable failure detector. Let ρR be a finite run of the crash-recovery
wrapper AR. Then, there exists a finite run ρ of A such that tr(ρR) is a subword of tr(ρ),
tr(ρR)(1) = tr(ρ)(1), last(tr(ρ)) = last(tr(ρR)), no processes fail in ρ, and in-flight mes-
sages of last(ρ) match the messages in the buffers of last(ρR).
I Theorem 3 (Preservation of detour-irreparable safety properties). Let A be a crash-stop
algorithm with an unreliable failure detector, and let P be a safety state property that is not
repairable through detours. If A satisfies P , then so does AR.
Proof. We prove the theorem’s statement by proving its contrapositive. Assume AR violates
P . By the definition of safety properties [4], there exists a finite run ρR of AR such that no
continuation of tr(ρR) is in P . By Lemma 2, there exists a run ρ of A such that tr(ρR) is
a subword of tr(ρ). By Lemma 1, ρ can be extended to an infinite run ρ · w of A. By the
choice of ρR, we have that tr(ρR) · tr(w) /∈ P . As tr(ρR) · tr(w) is a subword of tr(ρ · w),
and since P is not detour repairable, then also tr(ρ · w) /∈ P . Thus, A also violates P . J
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Proving that the safety properties of consensus are detour-irrepairable, means that these
properties are preserved by our wrapper. Since state invariants are also detour-irreparable,
they too are preserved by our wrapper. This makes our wrapper potentially useful for reusing
other kinds of crash-stop algorithms in a crash-recovery setting, not just the consensus ones.
I Corollary 4. If A satisfies the safety properties of consensus, then so does AR.
I Corollary 5. If A satisfies a state invariant, then so does AR.
6 Probabilistic Termination
Termination of consensus algorithms depends on stable periods, during which communica-
tion is reliable and no crashes or recoveries occur. In this section, we first state a general
result about so-called selective stable periods for our probabilistic crash-recovery model. We
then define a generic class of crash-stop consensus algorithms, which we call bounded algo-
rithms. We prove that termination for these algorithms is guaranteed in our probabilistic
model when run under the wrapper. Namely, we prove that, with probability 1, all processes
eventually decide. We also show that the class of bounded algorithms covers a wide spectrum
of existing algorithms including the celebrated Chandra-Toueg [8] and the instantiation of
the indulgent framework of [20] that uses failure detectors.
6.1 Selective Stable Periods
Similar to [11], our proofs will rely on forming strongly-connected communication compo-
nents between particular sets of processes. However, we will require their existence only for
bounded periods of time, which we call selective stable periods.
I Definition 6 (Selective stable period). Fix a crash-recovery algorithm AR. A selective-
stable period of AR of length ∆ for a crash-recovery configuration c and a set of processes C,
written stable(AR,∆, c, C), is the set of all sequences c = c0, c1, . . . c∆+1 of crash-recovery
configurations such that ∀i. 1 ≤ i ≤ ∆ + 1 we have ci.F = Π \C and there exist rmsgsi such
that (ci, (rmsgsi, ∅), ci+1) is a step of AR and rmsgsi(p)(q) is defined ∀p, q ∈ C.
Such selective stable periods must occur in runs of a crash-recovery algorithm AR.
I Lemma 7 (Selective stable periods are mandatory). Fix a crash-recovery algorithm AR, a
positive integer ∆ and a selection function sel : CR → 2Π, mapping crash-recovery configu-
rations to process sets. Then, the set of crash-recovery runs
{c0, l0, c1, . . . | ∀i ≥ 0. ci, li, . . . , ci+∆+1 /∈ stable(AR,∆, ci, sel(ci))}, has a probability of 0.
The next section shows how our wrapper exploits such periods to construct crash-recovery
algorithms from existing crash-stop ones in a blackbox manner. For future work it might
also be interesting to devise consensus algorithm directly on top of this property.
6.2 Bounded Algorithms
We next define the class of bounded crash-stop algorithms for which our wrapper guarantees
termination in the crash-recovery setting. This class comprises algorithms which operate in
rounds, with an upper bound on the number of messages exchanged per round as well the
number of rounds correct processes can be apart. More formally, they are defined as follows.
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I Definition 8 (Bounded algorithms). A crash-stop consensus algorithm (using reliable links
and a failure detector [8]) is said to be bounded if it satisfies all properties below:
(B1) Communication-closed rounds: processes operate in rounds. The rounds must be
communication-closed [14]: only the messages from the current round are considered.
(B2) Externally triggered state changes: After the first step of every round, the pro-
cesses change state only upon receipt of round messages, or on a change of the failure
detector output.
(B3) Bounded round messages: There exists a bound Bs such that, in any round, a
process sends at most Bs messages to any other process.
(B4) Bounded round gap: Let Nc = N − Nf , that is, the number of correct processes
according to the algorithm’s resilience criterion. Then, there exists a bound B∆, such
that the fastest Nc processes are at most B∆ rounds apart.
(B5) Bounded termination: There exists a bound Badv such that for any reachable
configuration c where any Nc fastest processes in c are correct, the other processes are
faulty, and the failure detector output at these processes is perfect after c, then all of
these Nc processes decide before any of them reaches the round rmax(c) +Badv.
We can check that an algorithm satisfies property (i) B4 by checking under what condition(s)
a process increments its round number, and (ii) B5 by observing the algorithm’s termination
under perfect failure detection given a quorum of correct processes. Section 6.3 shows an
example of how to check that properties B4 and B5 hold. Using this definition, we can prove
that bounded algorithms terminate in selective stable periods of sufficient length.
I Theorem 9 (Bounded selective stable period termination). Let A be a bounded algorithm
and AR its wrapped crash-recovery version. Let c be a reachable crash-recovery configuration
of the AR, and let C be some set of Nc fastest processes in c. Then, there exists a bound B,
such that, for any selective stable period of length B for c and C, all processes in C decide
in AR. Moreover, the bound B is independent of the configuration c.
Proof. We partition the processes from C into the set A (initially C) and NA (initially ∅).
The processes in A will advance their rounds further, and the processes in NA will not
advance, but will have already decided. Let p be some slowest process from A in c. We first
claim that p advances or decides in any selective stable period for c and C of length at most
Bslow, defined as Bslow = Bs · B∆ + 1. Denote the period configurations by c = c0, c1, . . ..
Then, using Lemma 2, we obtain a crash-stop configuration cs1 from c1 that satisfies the
conditions of bounded termination, with the processes from C being correct, and the others
faulty. We consider two cases.
First, if p advances in the crash-stop model after receiving all the in-flight round messages
in cs1 from other processes in A, then it also advances in the crash-recovery model after
receiving these messages. Moreover, our wrapper delivers all such messages within Bs ·B∆
steps, as (1) it uses LIFO buffers; (2) bounds B∆ and Bs apply to cs1 by (B3) and (B4); and
(3) by Lemma 2, the same bounds also apply to c1.
Second, if p does not advance in the crash-stop model, then, since the failure detector
output remains stable, and since no further round messages will be delivered to p in the
crash-stop model, the requirement (B2) ensures that p will not advance further in the crash-
stop setting. Moreover, requirements (B5) and (B2) ensure that pmust decide after receiving
all of its round messages; we move p to the set NA.
We have thus established that the slowest process from A can move to either NA or
advance its round after Bslow steps. Next, we claim that we can repeat this procedure by
picking the slowest member of A again. This is because the procedure ensures that the
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processes in NA always have round numbers lower than the processes in A. Thus, due
to (B1) and (B2), the processes in A cannot rely on those from NA for changing their state.
Lastly, we note that this procedure needs to be repeated at most Biter = N ·(B∆ +Badv)
times before all processes move to the round rmax(c)+Badv, by which point (B5) guarantees
that all processes terminate. Thus Bslow ·Biter gives us the required bound B. J
The main result of this paper shows that the wrapper guarantees all consensus properties
for wrapped bounded algorithms, including termination.
I Theorem 10 (CR consensus preservation). If a bounded algorithm A solves consensus in the
crash-stop setting, then AR also solves consensus in the probabilistic crash-recovery setting.
Proof. By Corollary 4, we conclude that AR solves the safety properties of consensus in the
crash-recovery setting. For (probabilistic) termination, the result follows from Theorem 9
and Lemma 7, using as the selection function for Lemma 7 (1) any function that selects some
Nc fastest processes in a configuration if no process has decided yet and (2) all processes, if
some process has decided. The latter allows us to propagate the decision to all processes,
due to short-circuiting in AR. J
6.3 Examples of Bounded Algorithms
We next give two prominent examples of bounded algorithms: the Chandra-Toueg (CT)
algorithm [8] and the instantiation of the indulgent framework of [20] that uses failure
detectors. For these algorithms, rounds are composite, and consist of the combination of
what the authors refer to as rounds and phases. Checking that the algorithms then satisfy
conditions (B1)–(B3) is straightforward. (B4) holds for the CT algorithm with B∆ = 4 ·N :
take the fastest process p in a crash-stop configuration; if its CT round number rp is N or
less, the claim is immediate. Otherwise, p must have previously moved out of the phase
2 of the last round r′p in which it was the coordinator, which implies that at least Nc
processes have also already executed rp. Since CT uses the rotating coordinator paradigm,
rp − r′p ≤ N ; as each round consists of 4 phases, B∆ = 4 ·N . For the algorithm from [20],
processes only advance to the next round (which consists of two phases) when they receive
messages from Nc other processes. Thus, B∆ = 2. Finally, proving the requirement (B5)
is similar to, but simpler than the original termination proofs for the algorithms, since it
only requires termination under conditions which includes perfect failure detector output.
For space reasons, we do not provide the full proofs here, but we note that Badv = phases ·
bN/2c for both algorithms, where phases is the number of phases per algorithm round.
Intuitively, within this many rounds the execution hits a round where a correct processor
is the coordinator; since we assume perfect failure detection for this period, no process will
suspect this coordinator, and thus no process will move out of this round without deciding.
I Corollary 11. The wrapped versions of Chandra-Toueg’s algorithm [8] and the instan-
tiation of the indulgent framework of [20] using failure detectors solve consensus in the
probabilistic crash-recovery model.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper introduced new system models that closely capture the messy reality of dis-
tributed systems. Unlike the usual distributed computing models, we account for failure
and recovery patterns of processes and links in a probabilistic and temporary, rather than a
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deterministic and perpetual manner. Our models allow an unbounded number of processes
and communication links to probabilistically fail and recover, potentially for an infinite num-
ber of times. We showed how and under what conditions we can reuse existing crash-stop
distributed algorithms in our crash-recovery systems. We presented a wrapper that allows
crash-stop algorithms to be deployed unchanged in our crash-recovery models. The wrapper
preserves the correctness of a wide class of consensus algorithms.
Our work opens several new directions for future investigations. First, we currently
model failures of processes as well as communication links individually and independently,
with a non-zero probability of failing/recovering at any point in time. In Appendix D,
we sketch how our results can be extended to systems where some processes may never
even recover from failure. It is interesting to investigate what results can be established
with more complicated probability distributions, e.g., if the model is weakened to allow
processes and links to fail/recover on average with some non-zero probability [15]. Second,
our wrapper fully persists the processes state. Studying how to minimize the amount of
persisted state while still allowing our results (or similar ones) to hold is another promising
direction. Finally, we focus on algorithms that depend on the reliability of message delivery.
Some algorithms, notably Paxos [23], do not. Finding a modular link abstraction for the
crash-stop setting that identifies these algorithms is another interesting topic. For those
algorithms, we speculate that preserving termination in the crash-recovery model is simpler.
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A Wrapper Description
In this section we provide the formal description of the wrapper that produces the crash-
recovery version AR of a crash-stop algorithm A. The message and local state spaces are
denoted byMR and ΣRp respectively.
The message space of AR is defined as MR = (M∪ {hb}) × (M∪ {m∅}). M is the
message set of A which we extend with a special heartbeat message hb being sent when no
message needs to be sent. The second part of each message represents an acknowledgment,
confirming the receipt of the last message on the channel in the opposite direction. The
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m∅ message indicates that no messages (including acknowledgment messages) have been
received so far.
The types of the components (st, buff, acks) of a record s ∈ ΣRp are
st of type Σp storing the state of p in the target crash-stop algorithm.
buff of type Π → M∗, where we recall that M∗ stands for the set of finite sequences
of messages from M. These are p’s outgoing message buffers, with one buffer for each
process in the system (including one for p).
acks of type Π→ (M∪{m∅}). This records, for each process q, the last message that p
received from q (if any). This will be used for acknowledgments.
Given a crash-recovery state s, a process p, and the partial function rmsgs : Π→MR of
messages received by p in the given round, we define the p’s local step unfolding for s and
rmsgs, written unfold(p, s, rmsgs) as follows. First, let:
mq be rmsgs(q) if q ∈ dom(rmsgs), and let mq be ⊥ otherwise. That is, mq is the
message from q that p receives, using ⊥ to indicate that no message was received.
Let fdo = {q | mq = ⊥}. That is, all processes from whom no message was received in
this step are suspected.
Then, unless p has decided yet and broadcasts the decision, the following sequence
unfold(p, s, rmsgs) of intermediate steps is taken. I.e., unfold(p, s, rmsgs) defines a sequence
of crash-recovery states and crash-stop labels s0, l0, s1, l1, s2, . . . sn, where the intermediate
state si represents the state record of p after processing the message of the i-th process,
defined as follows:
1. s0 = sp
2. Recalling that we number the processes from 1 to N , li and si+1 are computed as follows,
for 0 ≤ i < N :
a. Unpack the message from i+1 if one has been received, Let (m, a) = mi+1 ifmi+1 6= ⊥,
and let m = ⊥ and a = ⊥ otherwise. If m 6= hb and m 6= ⊥ we check that the message
has not been acknowledged yet, si.ack(i+ 1) 6= m, in which case we feed the message
to A’s next function: si+1.st = A.next(si.st, (i + 1,m), fdo). We also need the next
state if no message (or a duplicate) has been received, as (si, lisi+1) needs to be a
transition of the crash-stop system. Hence, if m = ⊥ or si.ack(i+ 1) = m, we feed ⊥
in and not m, i.e., si+1.st = A.next(si.st,⊥, fdo).
b. we set li = (p, (i + 1,m), ∅, fdo) or l1 = (p,⊥, ∅, fdo) accordingly. In both cases, the
set of failed processes in this label is empty.
c. We remove the acknowledged message (if any) from the head of the outgoing buffer
for this process. More precisely, let b′ be the buffer obtained as follows. First, copy
the buffer of all other processes except i+ 1.
b′(j) = si.buff(j) for all j 6= i+ 1.
Next, if there are messages to send to process i + 1, i.e., si.buff(i + 1) 6= [], and if
a 6= ⊥ and a is equal to head(si.buff(i+ 1)), then we let b′(i+ 1) be tail(si.buff(i+ 1));
otherwise, let b′(i+ 1) = si.buff(i+ 1).
To add a potential new message to the buffer, let new = A.send(si+1.st). These are the
new messages that p wishes to send, at most one destined to each process in the system.
We define si+1.buff(j) = b′(j), if new(j) is undefined, and si+1.buff(j) = new(j) · b′(j)
otherwise. Notice that we add the new message at the head of the list; as we will also
remove messages from the head when in the send function, our buffers are LIFO.
d. If m 6= ⊥ and m 6= hb, then si+1.acks(i + 1) = m, and si+j .acks(j) = si.acks(j) for
j 6= i+ 1.
Finally, given a crash-stop algorithm A using an unreliable failure detector with range 2Π
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and with the per-process state space Σp, we define its crash-recovery version AR where:
AR.I is the set of crash-recovery configurations c such that there exists a crash-stop
configuration cs ∈ A.I such that:
1. for each p:
a. c.sp.st = cs.sp
b. c.sp.buff(q) = [] for all q. That is, initially, no messages are buffered.
c. c.sp.acks(q) = m∅ for all q. Initially, no messages are acknowledged.
2. c.F = cs.F
AR.next(sp, rmsgs) = last(unfold(p, sp, rmsgs)).
AR.send(sp)(q) is:
(head(sp.buff(q)), sp.acks(q)) if sp.buff(q) 6= [], and
(hb, sp.acks(q)), otherwise, i.e., if we have nothing else to send.
B Markov chains
Our probabilistic crash-recovery model uses Markov chains [6]. We recall the basic notions
here which are relevant for our proofs.
A (discrete-time) Markov chain is a tuple (S, P, ι) where:
S is a countable, non-empty set of states
P : S × S → [0, 1] is the transition probability function such that for all states s:∑
s′∈S P (s, s′) = 1.
ι : S → [0, 1] is the initial distribution, such that
∑
s∈S
ι(s) = 1.
For a Markov chain, the cylinder set spanned by a finite word u over S is defined as the
set: Cyl(u) = {u · v | v is an infinite word over S} . These sets serve as the basis events of
the σ-algebras of Markov chains. If u = s0, s1, . . . sk, then Pr(Cyl(u)) = ι(s0) · P (s0, s1) ·
P (s1, s2) · · ·P (sk−1, sk).
C Omitted Proofs
C.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Informally, we obtain ρ by unfolding the crash-recovery steps of ρR. In other words, we
extend each crash-recovery step to its corresponding crash-stop steps. Recall that a single
step in the crash recovery setting may abstract the receipt of multiple messages, while every
received message in the crash-stop setting is step of the algorithm.
The only difficulty is handling process recovery, which does not exist in the crash-stop
system. Here, we exploit the fact that, in asynchronous systems, crashed processes are
indistinguishable from delayed ones. This enables us to keep ρ free from failed processes.
We now state our claim more formally, and then prove it by induction. We claim that
there exists a finite run ρ such that:
(P1) tr(ρR) is a subword of tr(ρ), with the same first and last character: tr(ρ)(1) = tr(ρR)(1)
and last(tr(ρ)) = last(tr(ρR)).
(P2) No failures occur in A, ρ(i).F = ∅ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |ρ|.
(P3) In-flight messages of A correspond to messages in the buffers of AR,
last(ρ).M = {(q, p,m) | m ∈ last(ρR).sp.buff(q) ∧ last(ρR).sq.acks(p) 6= m}. Here, we
overload ∈, writing m ∈ buff even though buff is a sequence.
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Proving the base case is easy, as ρR(1).s.st is an initial state of A, and both the in-flight
set of messages M and all the buffers are empty for initial configurations (follows from our
wrapper’s definition).
We now prove the step case. Let ρR and ρ be as above, let:
c = last(ρ),
cR = last(ρR),
(cR, lR, c′R) ∈ Tr(AR), and
ρ′R be the extension of ρR with (cR, lR, c′R).
In other words, c′R, is a next “letter” we could add to a valid run of AR. Thus, we will prove
that we can extend ρ with a series of transitions, to obtain a run ρ′ such that the claim holds
for ρ′R and ρ′. The extension is obtained by concatenating the unfoldings of each process’s
local step. More precisely, we define the sequences (fragments) fr0 . . . frN where fr i is the
unfolding of process i’s local steps:
fr0 = [c]
if i ∈ cR.F , then fr i = [last(fr i−1)]
if i /∈ cR.F , then fr i is the sequence [c0, l0, c1, . . . cN ] such that:
c0 = last(fr i−1)
c0.si, l0, c1.si, l1, . . . cN .si is unfold(i, c0.si, lR.rmsgs)
ck.sj = ck−1.sj for j 6= i and 0 < k ≤ N (the state of other processes does not change)
ck.M = ck−1.M \ {lk−1.rmsg} ∪ {(j, i,m) | (j,m) ∈ Γ(send(ck−1.si))}, for 0 < k ≤ N
(messages delivered to i are removed the in-flight message M and new messages sent
by i are added)
ck.F = ∅ for 0 < k ≤ N
Since the successive fragments overlap at one state, we define
ρ′ = ρ · tail(fr0) · tail(fr1) · . . . · tail(frN ).
and we let c′ = last(ρ′). It is easy to check that the definition of unfold and the correspon-
dence we establish between the buffers ensure that ρ′ is a (finite) run of A. Finally, we show
the claim:
For all p, if p /∈ cR.F then:
c′R.sp = AR.next(cR.sp, lR.rmsgs(p)) (def. of CR-steps)
= last(unfold(p, cR.sp, lR.rmsgs(p))) (def. of wrapper)
= c′.sp (def. of c′)
and if p ∈ cR.F , then
c′R.sp = cR.sp (def. of CR-steps)
= c.sp (inductive hypothesis)
= c′.sp (def. of c′)
Hence, c′R.s.st = c′.s, and given the inductive hypothesis, we conclude that tr(ρ′R) is a
subword of tr(ρ′), and (P1) holds.
ρ′(i).F = ∅ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |ρ′|. Thus, (P2) holds.
C.2 Proof of Corollary 4
We first prove that each of the safety properties of consensus is a detour-irrepairable safety
property. The rest follows directly from Theorem 3.
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1. Validity: Consider a word w such that w(i, p).dec = x, where x 6= ⊥ ∧ x 6= w(1, q).inp, ∀q.
In other words, w violates validity. Adding states between the initial state, w(1), and
w(i), creates a new word where w′(1, q).inp = w(1, q).inp, ∀q and ∃i′ ≥ i : w′(i′, p).dec =
x. Thus, adding further states does not change the fact that x is neither ⊥ nor equal to
an initial value. Validity is hence detour-irreparable.
2. Integrity: Consider a word w such that w(i, p).dec = x and w(i′, p).dec = x′, where
x 6= ⊥, i′ > i and x′ 6= x. Adding further states between w(1), w(i) and w(i′) results
in word w′ where ∃j′ ≥ j ≥ i : w′(j, p).dec = x ∧ w′(j′, p).dec = x′ and w′(1, q).inp =
w(1, q).inp, ∀q. Thus, adding further states does not change the fact that x is neither
⊥ nor that x′ 6= x and hence integrity is detour-irreparable.
3. Agreement: Consider a word w such that w(i, p).dec = x and w(i′, q).dec = x′, where
x, x′ 6= ⊥ and x′ 6= x. Adding further states between w(1), w(i) and w(i′) creates a new
word w′ where ∃j′ ≥ j ≥ i : w′(j, p).dec = x ∧ w′(j′, q).dec = x′. Notice that even if
∃j′ ≥ j′′ ≥ j : w′(j′′, p).dec = ⊥, this does not change the fact that w′(j, p).dec = x.
Thus, adding further states does not change the fact that two different processes p and q
have decided x 6= ⊥ and x′ 6= ⊥ x respectively, where x 6= x′. This shows that agreement
is detour-irreparable.
C.3 Proof of Lemma 7
We first prove two auxiliary results.
I Lemma 12 (Selective recovery always possible). For any crash-recovery algorithm AR and
any configuration c of its probabilistic crash-recovery system, and C any set of processes(∑
c′
P (c, c′) · Jc′.F = Π \ CK) > |C|F (1− F )N−|C|.
Proof. The normalization factor nftrans(c) in the definition of the Markov chains in Sec-
tion 3.3 is the inverse of:∑
c′
∑
rmsgs
J∃fails, c′. (c, (rmsgs.fails), c′) ∈ Tr(AR)K·
∏
p,q
(Jrmsgs(p)(q) definedK · N (q, p, c.n)
+ Jrmsgs(p)(q) undefinedK · Jq /∈ c.F K · (1−N (q, p, c.n)))
and thus larger than 1. Together with the definition of trans(c) and F , we can see that the
left hand side is larger than |C|F (1− F )N−|C| · nf trans. J
I Lemma 13 (Selective stable periods possible). Consider a crash-recovery algorithm AR,
a positive integer ∆, and a set of processes C. Then, there exists an ss > 0 such that
for any configuration c0, there exist subsequent states c1, c2, . . . cB such that c1, . . . cB is a
selective-stable period
Proof. From Lemma 12, we can find a c1 such that P (c0, c1) > |C|F (1 − F )N−|C|. Note
that for i ≥ 1, given ci, ci+1 is unique, since the algorithm is deterministic and since we
require that all messages between processes in C go through (rmsgs is defined). From the
definition of trans, we can easily deduce P (ci, ci+1) > |C|
2
N ·|C|F (1−F )N−|C| for i > 1, since
ci.F = Π − {C} by construction. Thus, |C|F (1 − F )N−|C| · (|C|
2
N · |C|F (1 − F )N−|C|)∆ can
be used as ss. J
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Finally, we prove Lemma 7.
Proof. Let noss(k) be the set of all finite runs of AR of length k which have no selective
stable periods. Define Cyl(noss(k)) =
⋃
τ∈noss(k)
Cyl(τ). By Lemma 13, we get:
Pr(Cyl(noss(k))) < (1− ss)b k∆ c.
For the set S of infinite runs with no stable periods, we have: S =
⋂
k
Cyl(noss(k)) and
since Cyl(noss(k + 1)) ⊆ Cyl(noss(k)) we have that Pr(S) = lim
k→∞
Pr(Cyl(noss(k))) ≤
lim
k→∞
(1− ss)b k∆ c = 0, since ss > 0 and ∆ is positive. J
D A nastier probabilistic environment
In the probabilistic model described in Section 3.3, we required the probabilistic failure
pattern FP to assign to all processes a positive probability of being up at all times. This
allows us to form arbitrary stable components for bounded lengths of time. Here, we define
a more difficult setting, where some processes can fail forever. However, the number of
the remaining processes must be large enough to allow termination. We thus change the
condition on the failure pattern from Section 3.3 as follows. We require that there exists a
set C of (intuitively “correct”) processes such that:
there exists an F > 0 such that ∀p ∈ C. ∀t. FP(p, t) ∈ (F , 1− F )
|C| > N −Nf
for all processes p /∈ C, there exist only a finite number of values t such that FP(p, t) > 0.
The third restriction allows us to eventually form a bounded stable period with a strongly
connected component of correct processes. Without it, we could have a process whose
probability of being up is oscillating between 0 and 1. Clearly, in a setting where only one
process has a probability of 1, and all others of 0 at all times, termination is impossible.
As this definition still does not add any runs to the system that did not exist in the
non-probabilistic environment, all results from Section 5 still hold. We next sketch how our
definition of bounded algorithms and our proofs need to change to preserve the termination
result in this more adversarial setting. First, note that the specification of termination has
to change in this setting; as processes not from C can crash forever, we cannot require them
to terminate.
Intuitively, consider the point in time in a crash-stop run after which all faulty processes
have already crashed. Faulty processes in this context are those processes that crash per-
manently, i.e. not in the set C above. A corresponding run in the crash-recovery system
would be in some state where the processes from C can recover with positive probability,
with processes being at different rounds. Our system now can be seen similar to our prob-
abilistic model described in Section 3.3, but now started from a different set of possible
initial states. We need to adapt our bounded round gap property (B4) to account for this
difference. Namely, we change it to require the bound to hold for any configuration where all
the faulty processes have crashed, and where we no longer assume that the fastest processes
are correct. The bound is dynamic, in that it can depend on the given configuration. The
bounded termination requirement (B5) also changes in a similar way; we no longer assume
that the fastest processes are correct, but that all the faulty processes have already crashed.
However, we do not need to make the bound Badv dynamic.
With these modifications, we can reuse the proof of Theorem 9 to show that non-faulty
processes of this nastier model decide, and hence terminate.
